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Abstract: Anonymous systems are usually used to protect users' privacy in network communication. However, even in the low-latency Tor system, it is accompanied by 
network communication performance degradation, which makes users have to give up using the anonymity system in many applications. Therefore, we propose a novel 
anonymity system with rotated multi-path accompanying virtual proxy mutation for data transmission. Unlike onion routing, in our system the randomly generated virtual 
proxies take over the address isolation executing directly on the network layer and expand the anonymity space to all terminals in the network. With the optimal algorithm of 
selecting the path, the network communication performance improved significantly also. The verification experiments show that the anonymity system terminal sends and 
receives data at 500 kbps, and only a slight delay jitter occurs at the receiving end, and the other network performance is not significantly reduced. 
 





With the development and widespread use of network 
technology, people rely more and more on network 
communication in their daily activities, which makes 
network attackers to possibly obtain a lot of valuable 
information by eavesdropping and analyzing the 
communication of users. Therefore, how to protect users' 
communication privacy from malicious adversaries 
becomes a strong demand. To effectively obtain the user's 
communication information, its basis is to obtain and 
accurately identify the user's communication information 
package. In the current packet switching network based on 
IP protocol, it is easy for attackers to accurately determine 
the two sides of the communication through the IP address 
contained in the communication packet head, and carry out 
the next step of violations based on this. At the same time, 
IP packets are forwarded along the route independently in 
the network, and the route selection algorithm is usually 
fixed (such as the shortest path first), which allows the 
attacker to leisurely select a weak node in the route to 
launch an attack. Therefore, the security of classical 
network communication is in a worrying state [1]. So, 
improving the privacy of network users is an important 
goal of network design. 
Anonymous System has been proposed to protect the 
privacy of network users. In most cases, attackers often can 
recognize participants of network communication easily, 
which will seriously weaken the network users' privacy. 
So, Anonymous System does not care about the 
confidentiality of content, because the confidentiality of 
content is always the task of encryption. Anonymity 
System usually uses a proxy relaying mechanism to 
achieve anonymity, and the proxy relay is usually divided 
into two types: trusted and semi-trusted. In most 
Anonymous systems, information on packets' 
identification modifying and forwarding is placed on the 
proxies, so users communicate based on indirect style. 
Through address isolation of proxy relay, communication 
identity information can be effectively hidden to protect 
information from eavesdroppers [2]. At present, there are a 
large number of Anonymity systems implementations 
based on the application layer [3], such as mixes [4], onion 
routing [5], and crowds [6]. However, this kind of indirect 
communication mechanism will lead to additional costs 
(such as delay, payload). Therefore, the high overhead of 
Anonymity systems will affect communication 
performance and limit its use. 
So far, many proxy-based Anonymous systems have 
been proposed, but this does not mean that we have many 
options to use. There are only a few systems that have been 
truly implemented and applied. There are many reasons for 
this, the number of users is an important factor and due to 
it often equivalent to the anonymous set which decided the 
effectiveness of the system. Especially in some systems, 
they require users to act as relay proxies simultaneously. In 
this way, with the increase in the number of users, the 
security of the system in terms of anonymity will become 
stronger and stronger. Unfortunately, a new system is often 
unattractive in its early stages. When the user group 
reaches a large scale, the centralized control will become a 
new bottleneck of the system in the classic distributed 
control model of network architecture. At the same time, 
communication complexity often leads to the poor 
performance of these anonymous communication systems 
[7]. These make some users have to give up using the 
anonymous system. 
Moving Target Defense (MTD) is one promising 
security technology. In recent years, MTD has been widely 
applied in the software field. At the same time, to meet the 
needs of network security, the researches of MTD are also 
constantly advancing, and a few schemes have been 
proposed and explored in some literature [8]. Typical 
methods of MTD on network security include port 
mutation, TCP fingerprint change, IP address mutation, 
and so on. However, in the traditional network, the 
application of MTD is relatively scarce. We consider that 
there are two major reasons for this problem. One is 
complex network management, and the second is the 
rigidity of network configuration. 
In classic networking architecture, MTD bogged down 
for lack of programmability and flexibility, which can be 
addressed effectively in Software-defined networking 
(SDN) [9]. SDN separates the control plane and data plane 
of network devices, the network devices become simple 
packet forwarding devices, and a logical central controller 
dictates overall behaviors of the network [10]. Different 
from the legacy network, the manager will be more flexible 
and agile at management in SDN. With SDN, we can 
introduce an innovation to the network agilely, and the 
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complex networking applications will be implemented 
easily [11]. Meanwhile, the centralized global network 
state view can facilitate adding new features to the network 
in the form of networking protocols. 
In this paper, adopting SDN architecture, we presented 
a novel anonymous system based on random virtual proxy 
mutation (RVPM) in SDNs. RVPM can construct an 
anonymous communication connection between the 
communication pairs, which has the following features. 
First of all, in the process of a session, routing is dynamic. 
Second, the three IP address translations are processed 
respectively at three proxies along the routing path. As a 
result, the identity of packets will change continually. 
Thirdly, relay proxies are randomly selected, and the 
proxies are virtual rather than real. The virtual relay proxy 
which consists of the assigned IP address and some 
resources on the specified switch is not a real terminal in 
the networks. Therefore, the virtual relay proxy can mutate 
with minimal operational overhead. Thus, RVPM can 
effectively hide the association between the IP address 
contained in the delivery packet and the communication 
terminal in the networks. The main contributions of the 
RVPM are as follows: 
1) Decoupling the association between system 
anonymity and the number of users. Users of the 
anonymous system do not need to play the role of the 
proxies for obfuscating the attackers in RVPM. Through 
the application on the controller, the system can select the 
switch as the virtual proxy image in a larger range; the 
forwarding switches on the routing path are all in the 
optional set to enlarge the anonymity of the system. 
2) Three-phase IP address translation architecture is 
adopted for anonymous communication. The virtual relay 
proxy needs to replace the identity of the packet and send 
it. The packet does not contain source route information 
like onion routing, so virtual relay proxy does not need to 
decrypt the packet and reassemble it to send the packet, and 
the terminal host does not need to encrypt the routing 
information in the packet header layer by layer. 
3) The packet forwarding operation can be completed 
in the underlying data plane without the participation of the 
terminal host and application layer. Compared with onion 
routing, the communication efficiency is higher and the 
delay is less. 
In RVPM, we introduced a virtual proxy mechanism 
with the dynamic variation of routing path which will cause 
more control information to be downloaded from the 
controller to the switches in the data plane. Meanwhile, the 
three-phase IP address translation also needs to install extra 
actions in the response switches. All operations will 
generate overhead on the control of the network. At the 
same time, higher anonymity means configuring network 
devices at a high frequency which brings the degradation 
of communication performance. Therefore, an effective 
algorithm is needed to find a proper trade-off point among 
the cost, communication performance, and anonymity. 
 
2 RELATED WORK 
 
In recent years, the privacy of users in network 
communication gets more and more concern. As one of the 
main ways is to protect the privacy of network users, 
anonymous communication systems have been widely 
concerned and studied. According to the size of the 
communication delay, the anonymous communication 
systems can be broadly divided into high latency 
anonymity systems (such as crowds [6], mixminion [4], 
etc.) and low latency anonymity systems (such as onion 
routing [5], Tor [12], P2P [13], etc.). 
The high-latency anonymous communication systems 
are mainly used for applications that require strong 
anonymity but are not sensitive to delays, such as e-mail. 
The main implementation of the high latency system is Mix 
network. However, for instant messaging, web browsing, 
and other network applications, the users may not tolerate 
an excessive communication delay and reduce their 
experience of users. Therefore, low-latency anonymous 
networking needs to be deployed to alleviate this problem. 
Tor is a low-latency anonymous system which has been 
widely deployed and used. As a second-generation onion 
routing network, Tor is also one of the most widely studied 
anonymous systems. 
The main principle of Onion routing to achieve 
anonymity is to realize the isolation of network addresses 
in packet delivery through relay proxy forwarding. Based 
on an overlay network, Tor's network communication 
performance is greatly reduced [14, 15]. This performance 
loss makes users have to abandon the anonymous system 
in some applications, thus giving up privacy protection. 
Existing research shows that Tor's defense against some 
network attacks is not efficient, such as traffic analysis 
[16], replay attacks [17], and so on. As the current research 
on attacks against anonymity systems is mainly focused on 
the Tor systems, such as traffic analysis attacks [18, 19], 
this makes the security of Tor itself a new research issue. 
The performance problems of Tor also lead to relevant 
research which is devoted to improving the communication 
performance and security of Tor, such as [20, 21]. 
SDN is an innovative network architecture that has 
emerged in recent years [22]. Its programmability makes 
network management and configuration agile. These 
characteristics make it possible to implement some 
anonymity methods that are hard to achieve in classic 
networks. Network security research based on SDN is also 
one of the hot topics in current network research [23]. 
Many achievements of research and exploration based 
on the advantages of SDN have been applied to promote 
the development of network security [24]. For example, 
OF-RHM uses IP mutation between end hosts to prevent 
malicious scanning and worm propagation [25]. However, 
the research on privacy protection based on SDN is still in 
its infancy, and there are few achievements. For example, 
based on SDN architecture, Tingwei Zhu et al propose a 
new anonymous communication system MIC for a data 
center [26]. In [27], the authors introduced address 
mapping (IP and MAC) into the SDN-based anonymity 
systems. As far as we know, there is no research on the 
anonymous system based on the isolation of network 
addresses through the virtual proxy dynamically deployed 
in the simple multi-routing path at the network layer and 




To help the reader understanding our method better, in 
this section we reviewed some basic styles of the 
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anonymous systems that have been deployed in practice. 
Then we proposed our anonymous communication system 
based on SDN. 
Tor using onion routing is the most famous anonymous 
communication system. The communication of the Tor 
depends on the packets forwarding on Onion Routers 
which constitute an overlay network. Each Onion Router is 
an internet terminal running applications that provide 
onion routing services. These terminals constitute an 
Onion router set for the selection of users. So, Tor is 
essentially an overlay network, and the links connecting 
Onion Router are some common internet paths. They are 
connected through TCP as a channel for information 
forwarding. To implement anonymous communication 
with the help of Tor, a user must install the onion routing 
service proxy application. These proxies listen to the local 
TCP connection of Tor all the time and redirect the packets 
that are not for it [12]. 
In the Tor system, users need to select some Onion 
routers from the list of all current active routers to construct 
the circuit to the destination, and subsequently the data 
packets are forwarded to the destination through these 
proxies. At the source node, the address of each forwarding 
proxy in the path is encapsulated in the head of each packet 
in turn, and the routing information is encrypted layer by 
layer. When a packet arrives at a proxy, the proxy decrypts 
one layer to obtain the address of the next proxy of the 
routing path, and encapsulates the remaining data in a new 
packet with the local IP address and the next proxy address, 
then forwards it to the next proxy in the route. This kind of 
operation makes each proxy in the route only know who 
sends packets to it, and whom it sends packets to, and other 
participants of the routing path are unknown to it. A typical 
Tor circuit consists of three independent proxies. 
Therefore, this multi-layer encryption of routing 
information and forwarding mechanism obscure the real 
source and destination IP address of the transmitting 
packets. 
Network address translator (NAT) is widely used as a 
public address multiplexing technology and private 
network access technology. Adopting dynamic address 
allocation, NAT can make it impossible to know the 
destination to which it is connected, thereby playing a role 
of concealing the real participants of the communication to 
a certain extent. 
For the Tor system, its packets delivery works at the 
application layer over an overlay network, and the 
communication link depends on the number and location 
of proxies in the network. The actual packet 
communication link length is much longer than the optimal 
route on the network layer, which will enlarge the 
propagation delay. At the same time, the anonymity space 
of Tor is related to the number of routing proxies active in 
the network. If the number of proxies is insufficient, the 
anonymity is poor. Under NAT, there is not much 
influence on the routing of packets in the network, except 
that the NAT server should be located at the gateway of its 
service network, that is, all service packets must pass 
through the NAT server. However, its anonymity is limited 
by the fixed location deployment of NAT and the shared 
address space it can provide. 
SDN has become a paradigm widely used in the 
network field, and more and more enterprises and 
organizations adopt it in their networks. Therefore, a novel 
anonymous communication system based on SDN has 
become a problem worthy of study. In SDN architecture, 
the intelligence of the network is extracted from the 
switches in the data plane to a logically centralized 
controller. Therefore, the switches of the data plane are 
only responsible for forwarding packets according to 
instructions from the controller. This feature provides 
network developers with flexible programmability, agile 
management, and the global state view of the network. 
Therefore, based on the advantages of SDN, we proposed 
a novel anonymous system RVPM which has some 
features as follows: 
1) Proxy's function is implemented on a centralized 
application on the controller, it is separated from the 
network elements and abstracted to the virtual proxy. The 
proxy produces some flow entries correspondingly, then 
these entries are downloaded into the switches for 
modifying and forwarding the packets; 
2) A communication circuit consists of three proxies, 
and each proxy only knows the address of the proxy which 
the packets come from, and is responsible for forwarding 
the packets to the next proxy; 
3) Do not need to be decrypted at getting the address 
of the next proxy, the address isolation is realized by NAT; 
4) The anonymous communication links are 
implemented at the network layer. 
All in all, based on function and execution separation, 
RVPM is capable of relieving the defects of the 
communication performance of Tor and the limited 
anonymous set of NAT system. The resulting system 
enables users to get better anonymous services. 
 
4 PROXY MODEL AND ARCHITECTURE 
 
In this section, we illustrate the virtual proxy model 
used in the anonymous system in detail. Then, an overview 
of the system architecture is given. 
 
4.1 Virtual Proxy Model 
 
In onion routing, the proxy application software 
running on the terminal receives the anonymity service 
data packet, uncovers the encrypted routing information in 
the packet to obtain the address of the next station, 
encapsulates the rest of the packet with the source address 
of itself and the destination address of the next station, then 
sends it. Therefore, the proxy realizes the address isolation 
of the data packet. NAT can realize the isolation of packet 
source address at the gateway also. In the SDN network, 
the same function can be achieved by configuring the flow 
table entries in the flow table of the forwarding device in 
the data plane, changing the source and destination address 
of the matched packets in the switch, and forwarding the 
modified packets to the destination. 
To better describe the implementation of address 
isolation in SDN, there is a simple example of the 
following: As shown in Fig. 1, terminal D is a proxy in 
onion routing. When receiving anonymity service data 
packet PBD from port 2 of switch S3, D decrypts the routing 
information part in the packet head, obtains the address of 
terminal F(10.0.0.6) which is the next station, and then 
encapsulates the remaining part of the packet in the packet 
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PDF and sends it to switch S3. S3 receives the packet from 
port 2, matches the flow table entries in flow tables and 
sends the packet to port 3. The packet format of packets 
PBD and PDF is shown at the top of Fig. 2. In terminal D, 
packet PBD is converted into packet PDF to realize address 
isolation of data packet delivery. 
 
Figure 1 An example of anonymous communication 
 
To better describe the implementation of address 
isolation in SDN, there is a simple example of the 
following: As shown in Fig. 1, terminal D is a proxy in 
onion routing. When receiving anonymity service data 
packet PBD from port 2 of switch S3, D decrypts the routing 
information part in the packet head, obtains the address of 
terminal F(10.0.0.6) which is the next station, and then 
encapsulates the remaining part of the packet in the packet 
PDF and sends it to switch S3. S3 receives the packet from 
port 2, matches the flow table entries in flow tables and 
sends the packet to port 3. The packet format of packets 
PBD and PDF is shown at the top of Fig. 2. In terminal D, 
packet PBD is converted into packet PDF to realize address 
isolation of data packet delivery. 
 
Figure 2 Packet changing in the address isolation 
 
In SDN, an anonymity application service can 
configure the flow tables of S3 through the controller. As 
shown at the bottom of Fig. 2, based on installing or 
updating the flow table entries, PBD' can be directly 
modified to PDF' when S3 receives the PBD'. Next, the PDF' 
will be sent out from port 3. The address isolation is 
achieved also. Specifically, the place where the packet 
address is changed and forwarded occurs in S3, and its 
function is controlled by anonymity application service, 
which does not require the participation of real terminal D, 
nor the installation of corresponding proxy software into 
terminal D. So, the implementation of the proxy function 
is called the virtual proxy model. Because no real terminal 
is needed to participate in address isolation, every terminal 
in the network can be mapped as a virtual proxy. 
 
4.2 System Components 
 
Figure 3 Architecture of the RVMP system 
 
There are a variety of split architectures we could use 
to implement the RVPM system, and the architecture 
design of RFCP [28] is one of the best. Therefore, we use 
it in the implementation of RVPM. RVPM system is an 
evolution from onion routing designs and is implemented 
in a logical centralized way based on the virtual proxy to 
better anonymity. It is flexible enough to accommodate 
different numbers of users and simplifies the deployment 
of ISPs. Due to no need for installing any proxy software 
into new users, RVPM facilitates the support of a large 
number of users. The system implementation is based on 
SDN controller, and mainly consists of the following two 
components (see Fig. 3): 
1) RouteFlowProxy: simple "proxy" application, 
located on the SDN controller (such as POX, Ryu) which 
needs to support anonymous communication service, 
topology discovery, and monitoring network states. 
2) Anonymous Communication Server (ACS): 
standalone application responsible for the core logic of the 
RVPM system (e.g., receiving service requests, triggering 
routing change events and proxy mutations, etc.). 
Anonymous communication server is implemented as an 
interactive module, using the knowledge information base 
to provide services for users. 
 
5 OPERATION AND SCHEDULING 
 
In the Tor system, to provide better anonymity, the 
circuit (anonymous communication path) can change in a 
session of communication. That is, the user can reselect the 
circuit during transmission. Typically, a circuit consists of 
three proxies. If a session's packets are represented as a 
flow, and a group of adjacent packets belonging to the 
same path in a session is represented as a sub-flow. That is 
a flow consists of several sub-flows, and the transmission 
route paths of any two sub-flows can be different. 
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Therefore, a communication session is divided into a 
sequence of sub-flow transmission. 
In the RVPM system, to enhance anonymity, not only 
the routing path of flow but also the proxies in a sub-flow 
transmission will change continuously and randomly. Like 
the Tor system, three virtual proxies are introduced into a 
routing path to achieve three times of address isolation. The 
address isolation operation causes the identity (source 
address and destination address) of the packet to be 
replaced three times along the routing path during delivery. 
The state of virtual proxies is maintained in RoutFlow 
Proxy, while an anonymous communication server (ACS) 
is responsible for routing path variation and virtual proxy 
mutation. In the case of virtual proxy mutation during a 
sub-flow transmission, the transfer path of packets does not 
change. However, in the case of route changing, the virtual 
proxy must be updated at the same time. Based on the 
agility management and global network view of the SDN 
controller, the RVPM system realizes the effective 
combination of low-frequency routing change and high-
speed virtual proxy change, so as to effectively restrain the 
burst of control resources requirement caused by the route 
mutation and improve the scalability of the system. 
 
5.1 Three-Phase Address Isolation 
 
In this section, we will explore three-phase address 
isolation with mutation of proxy and route. Its 
Implementation is based on OpenFlow, a widely used 
South interface protocol in SDN. Therefore, the RVPM can 
be easily deployed in the network. As shown in Fig. 3, the 
anonymous communication service (ACS) is responsible 
for accepting the anonymity service request of users in the 
RVPM system, and the service is based on the prior 
agreement of both parties (service provider and users). 
When a packet of a new flow of the anonymous 
communication accesses the switch at the network edge, 
the switch will send a request of flow service to the 
controller while there is no matching flow entry in flow 
tables of the switch. The controller receives the request, 
then the flow monitoring application will be triggered, and 
a user anonymous communication service request will be 
triggered as well. After receiving the request, the ACS will 
take over the transport service of the flow from the 
controller. The ACS obtains the current network status 
based on the data in the DB, calculates the routing path set 
for the flow, selects the current transmission path, and 
selects three suitable virtual agents from the Route-Flow 
proxy based on the current path as well. 
In the RVPM system, each path of one flow has three 
virtual proxies which are responsible for three-phase 
network address isolation. We denote them virtual source 
proxy (vsP), virtual intermediate proxy (viP) and virtual 
destination proxy (vdP) respectively. The routing paths 
from the sender, vsP, viP, and vdP to the receptor must 
overlap in turn. We use PSR, PvsR, PviR, and PvdR to represent 
the paths from the sender, vsP, viP, and vdP to the receptor 
respectively, which are calculated by the route path 
generation strategy. The paths satisfy the Eq. (1): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )vdR R viR R vsR R RP PS P PS P PS PS∩ ⊂ ∩ ⊂ ∩ ⊂     (1) 
 
As shown in Fig. 4, the sender is the initiator of 
anonymous communication and the receptor is the 
destination of the communication. After the ACS has 
deployed a circuit (install the flow entries into the 
corresponding flow table in the data plane through the 
controller along the currently selected path), the 
communication is initiated. In communication, the identity 
of data packets sent by the sender is replaced by vsP at the 
first time, and for the receptor, the vdP is always used to be 
a substitute of the sender. viP is between vsP and vdP. viP 
receives packets from vsP, replaces the identity of them 
and sends them to vdP. 
 
Figure 4 An example of an anonymous communication 
 
Unlike the Tor system, because vsP is specified by the 
system, the sender does not know the IP address of vsP, 
and the destination for the sender's communication packet 
is still the receptor, so the address isolation of vsP is more 
similar to NAT. To ensure the stability of communication, 
vdP cannot be changed in a session, which ensures that the 
receptor seems to consistent communication with vdP. In 
the whole communication process, vsP and viP can change 
continuously according to anonymous communication 
needs. The high-frequency hopping of VP will increase the 
unpredictability of communication, but at the same time, it 
should be noted that the hopping will bring additional 
control cost. 
 
5.2 Control Strategy 
 
There are two kinds of variety in the RVPM system: 
route varying and proxy mutation. When the route varies, 
the packets' path of flow changes, which may cause the 
change of proxies. When the route remains unchanged, the 
proxy can mutate independently in a sub-flow 
transmission. In the initial phase, the sender's flow needs 
anonymous communication service, the request is sent 
from the access switch to the ACS, and if the ACS accepts 
the request, an anonymous communication channel is 
constructed for the flow. The specific process is as follows:  
1) When the ACS accepted the sender's request, it 
obtains the address of the sender and the receptor. Then, 
based on the network topology, the BFS algorithm is used 
to calculate and obtain multiple simple paths between the 
sender and receptor, and these paths are saved in a path set; 
2) During the period of communication, the ACS 
changes the transmission path according to the network 
status, path set, and path usage status. The specific path 
update selection algorithm is detailed in Section 5; 
3) After selecting the path, the ACS needs to determine 
three OpenFlow switches along the path according to 
Formula 1. The three proxies vsP, viP, and vdP are selected 
to satisfy the maximum anonymity; 
4) The flow entries for setting the routing path and the 
flow entries for the three proxies to complete the address 
isolation are generated by ACS, then these entries are sent 
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to the corresponding switches along the path through the 
controller; 
5) The sender transmits the packet to vsP. vsP receives 
the packet from the sender, changes the IP address in the 
packet header, and then forwards it to viP. Similarly, viP 
receives packets from vsP, then changes the IP address in 
the packet header and sends it to vdP. Finally, vdP receives 
the packet from viP, changes the IP address in the packet 
header, and sends it to the receptor; 
6) During the period of communication, when the flow 
transmission attains a certain time, the routing path and the 
proxies will be changed by ACS. Similarly, during the 
period of sub-flow transmission, when reaching a certain 
time, the vsP and viP mutation will be triggered. The new 
virtual proxy is selected according to Formula 1. After a 
proxy changes, it needs to issue the update instructions to 
the corresponding switches to complete the address 
isolation and ensure the communication is not interrupted. 
 
Figure 5 A series of IP address translations for the packets 
 
In the RVPM system, the packets traverse the network 
through a series of IP address translations. As shown in Fig. 
5, packets from the sender (IP address is IP1) to the 
receiver (IP address is IP2) will experience IP replacement 
three times at three proxies respectively. 
To issue update instructions of the RVPM system to 
the switches in the data plane, corresponding flow entries 
should be generated and downloaded from the controller to 
the flow table of the corresponding switch. In general, a 
flow entry consists of three components: match fields, 
counters, and a set of actions or operations. The main 
operations include forwarding, deleting, modifying, etc. In 
the RVPM system, it is necessary to modify and forward 
packets when address isolation is needed. 
 
5.3 Communication Protocol 
 
The sender's data flow arrives at the access switch on 
the network edge which will trigger the request of path 
service, and the anonymous request to the ACS will be 
triggered by the monitoring on the controller (step 1) (as 
shown in Fig. 6). If the ACS accepts the request, it 
produces and downloads the relevant update instructions to 
the switches along the path based on the controller (such as 
Ryu [29]), which includes the selection of the three 
switches that perform the proxy function (step 2). The 
functions of proxies are performed on the switches to 
complete the source/destination IP address conversion and 
packet forwarding (steps 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). Other switches 
except for proxy on the path are configured as forwarding; 
they are only responsible for forwarding packets according 
to the destination IP address. From now on, the system can 
match and forward (or with modify) the packets of the flow 
through the switches according to the flow entries in the 
flow table. At this time, the packets from the sender to the 
receptor will realize three times of address isolation to 
complete anonymous communication. 
 
Figure 6 Communication via anonymity service 
 
6 ROUTING ALGORITHM 
 
In the RVPM system, the ACS needs to keep some 
resources on the RouteFlow Proxy to maintain the 
communication itself. So, a large number of services means 
a large amount of resource overhead. Therefore, the routing 
algorithm adopted by the RVPM must be simple and 
effective. 
Anonymous communication is essentially a kind of 
flow delivery based on special routing service. A flow is 
divided into many sub-flows according to a series of time 
slots. A time slot is one duration of a sub-flow 
transmission. Before a sub-flow transmitting, the ACS 
must choose one path for the next sub-flow and adjust the 
proxies based on the path. 
The number of virtual proxies used in the system is 
different at a different time and the number of active virtual 
proxies determines the strength of the anonymity of 
communication directly. Due to selecting the proxies based 
on the routing path, the path selecting algorithm of the 
system is very important. At the same time, the anonymity 
of communication will be enhanced by vsP and viP 
constant hopping in the process of sub-flow transmission. 
When vsP or viP changes, the newly selected proxies 
should meet the Eq. (1). 
Because the number of simple paths between the 
sender and the receptor is far less than the number of virtual 
proxies, and the number of switches in one path responsible 
for executing the proxy function is limited. Therefore, it is 
necessary to carefully select the path set used in the 
delivery and optimize its scheduling, so as to enhance its 
defense ability against attackers. 
The data flow in the network can be divided into 
elephant flow and mice flow according to its size. For the 
mice flow, its duration is short, so the attack time window 
left to the attacker is also small. Therefore, here we focus 
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on the anonymous transmission of elephant flow. To 
simplify the discussion and implementation, we will use 
the method of static time slot division to decompose an 
elephant flow into some small sub-flows, where the sub-
flows are independent of the number of packets and only 
related to the length of timeslots. In other words, a sub-flow 
is a set of packets over a continuous period along a path.  
We refer to the duration of a sub-flow as Δt, and its 
size is determined by the ACS. At the same time, we refer 
to the duration of flow as T. Therefore, T consists of a series 
of Δt, i.e. T = n × Δt. The start of sub-flow means that a 
new routing path should be selected and configured. So, 
ACS selects a new path from the path pool and issues 
update instructions into the data plane to complete path 
replacement. The simple path calculation method (such as 
BFS, Suurball algorithm etc.) between two points in the 
graph is used in the system to obtain the initial path set. 
The vdP is determined according to the path set, and the 
path PvdR generated from the vdP to the receptor according 
to the routing policy meets Eq. (2). 
 
( ) ( )vdR SRi SRiP P Φ, P P and i  1, 2, ..., n∩ ≠ ∈ ∈                    (2) 
 
where P is the paths in the path pool which consists of all 
candidate paths, P = {PSR1, PSR2, …, PSRn}. 
In the initial phase of anonymous communication, the 
path pool consists of K paths. Each path has an equal initial 
contention window size. We refer to it as CW. In our 
algorithm, we set the initial value CW = 1. Therefore, each 
path has the same opportunity to be selected as a 
communication channel at the beginning of the flow 
transfer. 
We formulate the path selection problem based on time 
slot Δt as a problem that every path in the path pool strives 
to become the communication channel. To ensure fairness, 
we set each path participating in the competition as 
independent of each other, and each path adopts the same 
random competition mode, so as to achieve the randomness 
and fairness of selection. The idea of fair competition 
mainly comes from the BEB algorithm (the BEB algorithm 
is detailed in IEEE 802.11dcf standard). Specifically, after 
a path selection, CW of all paths needs to be adjusted. 
There are two types of adjustments. The winner's CW will 
be adjusted to the minimum, while the loser's CW will be 
doubled if it does not attain the maximum. 
To further improve the fairness and randomness, 
collective constraint and weighted combination is a 
common method [30]. In the algorithm, we introduce a 
parameter D to describe the history of path selection and 
refer to D as a duty cycle. D will participate in CW tuning 
to reduce the duty cycle difference for each path. The CW 
adjustment method with D is different from the traditional 
BEB algorithm, which only considers adjusting the size of 
the contention window according to the competition 
results. Parameter D represents the past state of the path 
that has transferred the sub-flows. At the same time, the 
threshold of D is introduced: Dh and Dl, where Dh is the 
upper limit value and Dl, is the lower limit value. The duty 







=                                                                              (3) 
where Pc represents the number of sub-flows that the path 
has undertaken and Psum represents the number of all sub-
flows at the calculating time. 
 
Algorithm 1 Routing algorithm 
Determine the path pool for anonymous 
communication 
Determine the vdP of the session. 
Determine the number K of the paths in the pool. 
Determine the slot time Δt of the sub-flow. 
1 for a path p in the pool do 
2      CW[p] = 1 
3 end for 
4 do 
5 if a new Δt beginning then 
6         CWsum =∑𝑝𝑝∈𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝CW[𝑝𝑝]; 
7         r = RAND(1..CWsum); 
8         inti; 
9         fori=0 to K do 
10           CWsum-= CW[i]; 
11           if r >CWsumthenbreak; 
12 end for 
13        Ps=i; //Ps is the selected path in this Δt 
14        fori=0 to K do 
15            if(i == Ps)then 
16              CW = max (CWmin, [CWpre*(1−D)]); 
17 end if 
18          CW = min (CWmax,[2*CWpre*(1−D)/kD]); 
19 end for 
20         T = T − Δt; 
21 end if 
22 while (T > 0) 
 
At the beginning of an anonymous communication. the 
Pc's value of every path in the pool is 0. As a path has 
succeeded in gaining the delivery task, its Pc will be 
increased 1. So, the Pc represents the number of successes 
in contention of the path. After a sub-flow started delivery, 
the value of the Psum will be increased 1. 
We consider, for example, a flow sends according to 
the time slot sequence as follows: 
Δt1, Δt2, …, Δtm, …, Δtn 
When selecting a path for Δtm+1, it is assumed that the 
D value of two paths is the same. One path X is transferred 
at Δt1, the other path Y is transferred at Δtm. Considering 
fairness and randomness, path X should get more 
opportunities. Therefore, we should increase the weight of 
factor time. Here a first-order linear digital filter is used as 
follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Δ 1 1 Δ 1 Δm m mD t D Dt tα α+ = ⋅ + +− ⋅                        (4) 
 
where the factor α represents the effect of the past state. 
The value of α is between 0 and 1. In addition, the higher 
the value of α, the more important the past state is, and a 
can get a proper value through big data analysis method 
similar to [31]. 
After a sub-flow starts to transport, the CW of each 
path in the pool will be adjusted as follows: 
If the path gets the delivery tasks, then 
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( )( )min premax , 1CW CW C DW= − ⋅                                     (5) 
 
If the path loses the delivery tasks, then 
 
( )( )max premin , 2 1CW CW CW / KD D = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −                    (6) 
 
In short, the routing algorithm has two characteristics. 
First, each path in the set can be fair. Secondly, the 
correlation among the selected paths in the sequence is 
weak. The routing algorithm is given by algorithm 1. 
 
7 SIMULATION AND EVALUATION 
 
In this section, we introduce the experiment 
configuration firstly. Then, we describe the 
communication performance and anonymity of the RVPM 
system. Finally, we discuss the overhead of the system and 
the comparison between RVPM and Tor. 
 
7.1 Experiment Configuration 
 
To verify the feasibility of the RVPM system, we set 
up a simple simulation system. The experiment 
environment consists of three computers and a server. Two 
computers act as the terminals needed communication, and 
ACS and the SDN controller (Ryu) run on the other 
computer. The simulation network adopts the Internet 2 
OS3E topology with 34 nodes [32], which are deployed in 
Mininet implemented on the server. The components of the 
simulation system are shown in Fig. 7. 
One of the two communication terminal accesses the 
network by Sunnyvale nodes of the network and the other 
is accessed by Houston nodes. The ACS and the controller 
are accessed by Chicago nodes. 
For evaluating the communication performance, the 
link delay of the network is required. With the latitude and 
longitude information of the nodes in the network, we can 
get the distance between nodes by using haverne formula 
[33]. Then, the propagation delay of every link is given by 
the Eq. (7). 
 
( ) ( )8Delay distance m 2 10 m/s/= ×                                      (7) 
 
Figure 7 Simulation network topology and components 
 
The terminals deploy software to send UDP packets 
and receive the packets. In the experiment, we choose three 
paths to constitute the set of candidate paths, which are 
identified by green, red and blue respectively in Fig. 7. In 
the verification experiment, the terminal accessed by the 
network node Sunnyvale sends data to the receiving end 
terminal which is linked to the network node Houston at 
the rate of 500 kbps for 3 minutes each time.  
 
7.2 Communication Performance and Anonymity 
 
Communication performance. The RVPM system 
adopts a more complex routing paradigm than the common 
routing method. So, the communication performance in the 
RVPM will degrade at parameters such as delay, packet 
loss ratio, band width, etc. For evaluating this 
phenomenon, in the experiment, the path varying interval 
is set to 5 s, 10 s, and 20 s respectively, and the proxy 
mutation interval is set to 1 s, 2 s, and 3 s respectively. 
Therefore, the packets are transmitted alternately 
along three paths to realize path various. At the same time, 
the source address and destination address of the packets 
are replaced during the transmission process. The receptor 
receives the data packets with the source addresses all of 
the selected VDP IP addresses. 
The experimental data are shown in Fig. 8. During the 
communication process, the packets received by the 
receptor have delay jitter. We find that the frequency of the 
delay jitter and the path varying frequency are the same, 
which is due to the differences in the propagation delay of 
the three paths (green: 13.61 ms, red: 17.72 ms, blue: 
29.23). The virtual proxy mutation has no significant 
impact on the performance of data communication. 
 
Figure 8 The receive packet interval in the experiment 
 
Due to no background traffic introduced in the 
experiment, the routing paradigm does not affect the 
bandwidth. At the same time, the pack loss rate has little 
change, the conservative strategy of varying the path and 
proxy is the other cause. So, the experiment is only used to 
verify the feasibility of RVPM system communication. In 
actual session communication, severe delay jitter will 
cause received packet to be out of order, resulting in packet 
loss. In severe cases, the session may be interrupted. 
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Therefore, when selecting the path set, pay attention to 
selecting the path with similar delays. When scheduling, 
avoid directly switching between two paths with large 
propagation delay differences to reduce the magnitude of 
delay jitter. That is also our further work. 
Anonymity. In a proxy-based anonymous 
communication system, the number of active proxies and 
the number of proxies enabled in a session determine the 
anonymity of the system communication. In general, the 
presence of a large number of active agents in the network 
means users have more choices when communicating. For 
attackers, if they want to implement a successful work, 
they have to scan and monitor more terminals, which will 
increase the attack resource cost and exploring the time 
window, and reduce the success rate of the attack. 
Therefore, more active proxies in the anonymity system 
mean that the system can provide better anonymity 
services. 
In the RVPM system, all active computers or terminals 
in the network theoretically become candidate activity 
proxies, thereby maximizing the anonymity space. In a 
specific application, in order to reduce the transmission 
delay in a session, the candidate path set is tailored to some 
simple path. At the same time, the proxy selection needs to 
meet the Eq. (1), and the space of the actual active proxy 
candidate will be reduced. Considering that the anonymity 
space in the RVPM system is theoretically all the active 
users in the network, and this reduction will bring more 
network transmission performance improvement, so this 
choice is worthwhile. At the same time, RVPM will also 
have a stronger ability to prevent Man-In-The-Middle 
attacks that may exist in the network. This ability comes 
from the fact that the session changes the communication 
path at a certain time interval, and that proxy is changed 
regularly in the same path during communication, which 
makes the attacker have to monitor more terminals under 
the same scan window. Therefore, the RVPM system has 
the ability to get the maximum anonymity, but in most 
cases, we need to select an optimal trade-off point between 




Overhead. In the Tor system, the users can freely 
choose proxies in the active proxy list, and the selected 
proxies are unknown to a third party. In the RVPM system, 
since the controller needs to configure the flow entries of 
flow tables in the corresponding switch to implement 
address isolation, so the selection of proxy happens in the 
centralized anonymity service application. At the same 
time, during the session, the anonymity service application 
also needs to maintain the path set, path usage, and proxy 
usage information for the next path or proxy selection, 
which will bring the extra cost to the server. 
As shown in Fig. 9, unlike common communication, 
during the communication period, it is needed to perform 
path and proxy mutation, so the number of control packets 
continuously increases. The flow entries stored in the data 
plane have some fluctuation, but the total storage 
requirement is not large. 
Due to the additional control overhead (the delivery of 
flow entries) and the degradation of communication 
performance (delay jitter, etc.) caused by paths and proxy 
varying, additional algorithms are needed to optimize these 
schedules. At the same time, the reliability and scalability 
of the RVPM system need to be studied in the next step. 
 
Figure 9 The overhead of communication in the RVMP system 
 
The comparison between RVPM and Tor. Tab. 1 
shows some differences between the RVPM system and the 
Tor system. Tor achieves anonymous communication 
through address isolation. The anonymous communication 
achieved anonymity by performing address isolation three 
times on the transmission channel of a data packet. 
However, this system needs enough proxies in the network 
to form sufficiently anonymity space, which is difficult to 
guarantee in the initial deployment stage of the system. 
Insufficient anonymity space will lead to the attractiveness 
of the system and the loss of users, which will make the 
system fall into trouble. The RVPM system can bypass the 
trouble by adopting virtual proxy. 
 
Table 1 The differences between the RVPM system and the Tor system 
 RVPM Tor 
Anonymity space All active terminals The agents with 
proxy software 
Deployment Centralization Distribution 
Routing policy Simple path Path above transport 
layer 
Address isolation Located in switches Located in agent 
Forwarding model Based on destination 
address 
Based on source 
routing (between the 
source and 
destination) , and 




In the onion routing, the user is not only the user of the 
system but also the service provider of the system. The 
problem of traffic cost and resource occupation will make 
some users unwilling to provide more services, which will 
cause the network service quality to decline. At the same 
time, onion routing is an application layer network above 
the transport layer, the path for the actual transmission of 
data packets through the relay is much higher than the 
optimal path of the packets, which results in a waste of 
network bandwidth. Long delivery path, application layer 
forwarding, packets' encryption/decryption will bring 
greater packet delay. At the same time, onion routing 
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requires each packet to carry routing information which 
results in bandwidth waste. 
In the RVPM system, applying the simple routing path 
to forward the packets on the network layer and directly 
replacing IP addresses of the packets on the switches along 
the path will relieve the waste of bandwidth and reduce the 




In this paper, we present RVPM, a multi-path oriented 
virtual proxy mutation anonymous communication system. 
Different from the classical onion routing based on the 
overlay network, based on the SDN architecture, the 
system realizes the strategy of combining multi-path time-
sharing transmission and virtual proxy mutation, which 
makes all active terminals in the network become candidate 
proxies, thereby the anonymity space of anonymity 
networking is maximized in theory, and at the same time, 
it creates a premise for the reasonable choice of multi-path. 
Since there is no need for the selected agent to 
participate in data forwarding, users do not need to 
download software to act as a proxy to forward data which 
leads to resource cost. The multi-path rotation and virtual 
route mutation during communication enhance the 
system's resistance to traffic analysis attacks and replay 
attacks. Because the address isolation occurs directly on 
the switches in the data plane, the data delivery path is 
simplified, and the occupation of network resources is 
eased. 
Although path hopping and proxy hopping will bring 
a certain amount of control overhead and service cost on 
the controller, the verification experiment shows that it has 
little impact on the overall performance of network 
communication, comparing with the anonymity and 
security obtained, it is worthy. Due to the lack of 
corresponding background traffic, our experiments are still 
in the simulation stage. Therefore, in the next step, we will 
introduce more efficient path scheduling algorithms and 
virtual proxy hopping based on network state awareness to 
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